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NOTES

"IF AN (ENDANGERED)

TREE FALLS IN THE

FOREST, AND NO ONE IS AROUND.....":
RESOLVING THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN
STANDING REQUIREMENTS AND
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
Preston Carter*
INTRODUCTION

During the mid-twentieth century, Congress passed a series of
statutes that changed the face of American law.' Legislative protection was extended to the air, water, endangered species, and tracts of
land where "the earth and its community of life [remain] untrammeled by man." 2 Many of these statutes include "citizen suit" provisions, an innovation designed to foster public participation in
environmental protection. 3 The participation encouraged by citizen
suits, however, did not follow the traditional model of civic involvement. Indeed, citizen suits were designed to "replace deficient pro*

Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2010; B.B.A., Finance

and Political Science, University of Notre Dame, 2007. I thank Professor John
Copeland Nagle for his helpful guidance and advice, as well as the members of
Volume 84 of the Notre Dame Law Review for their hard work.
1 See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, "Greening" the Constitution-HarmonizingEnvironmental and Constitutional Values, 32 ENv-rL. L. 809, 809 (2002).
2 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2006). These resources are protected, respectfully, by the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1294-1297 (2006); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (2006);

and the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2006).
3 See Frank B. Cross, Rethinking Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 TEMP. ENr-,L. L. &
TECH. J. 55, 64 (1989).
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grams of administrative enforcement ' 4 with a body of "private
attorneys general," 5 encouraging citizens to air their grievances in
Article III courts rather than through the political process. 6 Understandably, this new7 model of enforcement has evoked a wave of commentary and criticism. 8 In the court system, the influx of citizen suits
has been accompanied by an evolution (or, many would say, devolution) of the doctrine of standing. Although the exact contours of the
standing doctrine still remain unclear,9 its most recent "phase" has
proved challenging to plaintiffs attempting to enforce environmental
statutes through citizen suits.' 0 In several notable cases, plaintiffs have
been barred from court despite Congress' apparent intent to enable
"any person" to proceed with a citizen suit. 1 These plaintiffs were
barred because they failed to assert a cognizable injury to themselves,

4 Id. at 56.
5 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6 See Cross, supra note 3, at 56. Citizen suits can be initiated against the Government (or government officials) in an attempt to compel them to carry out their statutory duties, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992), or
against private parties for alleged violations of a statute, e.g.,
Friends of the Earth, Inc.
v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-88 (2000).
7 Commentators have noted, however, that citizen suits resemble the qui tam
actions available shortly after the founding, and thus are not new. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's StandingAfter Lujan ? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,"and Article III, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 163, 174-77 (1992).
8 See generally id.; Robin Kundis Craig, Will Separation of Powers Challenges "Take
Care" of Environmental Citizen Suits? Article II, Injury-in-Fact,Private "Enforcers," and Lessonsfrom Qui Tam Litigation, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 93 (2001) (examining separation of
powers issues raised by citizen-suits brought under environmental statutes); Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
185 (discussing the various ways in which citizens involved themselves in environmental enforcement).
9 Some commentators consider standing "'among the most amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain of public law.'" Katherine A. Burke, Comment, Can We
Stand for It? Amending the Endangered Species Act with an Animal-Suit Provision, 75 U.
COLO. L. REV. 633, 642 (2004) (quotingJOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 83 (6th ed. 2000)).
10 Commentators have divided the Court's standing jurisprudence into several
"eras" or "phases." See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 168.
11 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35
(1972); Am. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 336 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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although the statutes were seeking to protect the environment,1 2 and
13
citizen suit provisions do not require personal harm.
An old riddle comes to mind: "If a tree falls in the forest, and no
one is around to hear, does it make any sound?" Adapted to the context of environmental law, the question can be posed: "If a tree falls in
the forest, and no one is around, can statutory protections be
By barring plaintiffs who do not sustain a
enforced via citizen suit?"
"particularized" injury, 14 courts answer in the negative. Congress,
however, in deciding to protect the tree itself, seems to desire an
affirmative answer to the question.
This divergence between the apparent will of Congress and the
doctrine of standing stems from the courts' view of their proper role
within the constitutional scheme of government. The Article III judiciary is established to adjudicate disputes between individuals, or "private rights," while the political branches are charged with creating law
and taking care that it be faithfully executed.' 5 Although a bright-line
"public-versus-private rights" rule has not been adopted as the touchstone for what can (or must) be adjudicated in Article III courts, 16 this
view of separation of powers has heavily influenced modern standing
12 Notably, some environmental statutes do seek to prevent harm to persons. See
Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 897,
899. The definition, however, between what constitutes "harm," be it to persons or to
the environment, is "ambiguous and contested" in the context of environmental law.
Id. at 900. This Note does not attempt to identify the precise harms which environmental laws seek to prevent, or claim that Congress' sole motive behind environmental statutes is to protect the environment. Rather, this Note proceeds on the
assumption that at least one purpose of environmental laws is to prevent harm to the
environment (whatever the definition of "harm" may be), even if the statutes protect
both persons and the environment.
13 For a discussion of these inquiries, see infra Part II.B. Although other statutes,
such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, contain "citizen suit" provisions, the provisions differ in that they permit any person aggrievedby a violation of this statute to sue
in court. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2006) (giving "any person alleging discrimination
on the basis of disability" standing to sue). In contrast, environmental statutes permit
"any person" to enforce the provisions in court. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006).
14 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
15 Id. at 577 (citing and quoting Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944)
(footnote omitted)); see also Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat
Standing Doctrine, 102 MiCH. L. Rav. 689, 694-712 (2004) (noting that the Article III
judiciary, historically, has limited itself to adjudicating private rights disputes).
16 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847 (1986);
see also Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the PoliticalBranches, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 559, 572
(2007) (noting that "the Constitution does not itself fix the precise contours of [public and private] rights").
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requirements. 17 Via the doctrine of standing, courts have resisted
congressional attempts to use them as a means through which ordinary citizens can influence execution of the law. Rather, an individual
may approach a court only when his or her suit seeks to vindicate a
"private right"; in other words, when the plaintiff suffers some injury
to him or herself and approaches the court seeking relief.' 8
Many disagree with this conception of the judiciary's role, and
the doctrine of standing has been thoroughly criticized. 19 However,
perhaps these criticisms are misplaced. After all, it was Congress that
decided to protect the environment, while granting persons the right
to sue. Additionally, it was Congress that determined to enforce these
statutory protections (at least partially) in the courts, whose jurisdiction is cabined by Article III. Thus, it makes sense that Congress
should attempt to resolve the resulting conflict between the branches.
This Note assumes that the doctrine of standing properly articulates the role of Article III courts in our tripartite system, and looks to
how Congress can repair the disconnect between the purpose of environmental statutes and the injuries required to convey standing. As
expressed in its standing decisions, 20 the judiciary's primary role is to
adjudicate private-rights disputes, while leaving creation and enforcement of the law to the political branches. Accordingly, there are two
ways in which Congress can remove the tension inherent in the current enforcement scheme: (1) provide a public-rights forum for adjudication of citizen suits brought under environmental laws by creating
an Article I tribunal; or (2) make environmental citizen suits mirror
private-rights disputes, by granting environmental resources the right
to bring citizen suits. Although both of these proposals would remedy
17 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559-60; see also Nelson, supra note 16, at 571-72
(2007) (claiming that the development of "American-style" separation of powers was,
in part, driven by the distinction between public and private rights).
18 "Private rights" are generally defined as those "held by discrete individuals," as
opposed to "public rights," which "belong to the body politic." Woolhandler & Nelson, supranote 15, at 693. Figuring out precisely what constitutes a "private" versus a
"public" right is admittedly not easy; this lends to the considerable confusion surrounding standing. See id. at 694.
19 Criticism of the doctrine runs the gamut from arguing that modern standing
doctrine itself constitutes a violation of separation of powers, see Sunstein, supra note
7, at 214, 235-36, to insisting that the doctrine "impose [s]a theory of value in which
human beings are the source and center of value" upon the populous, Francisco
Benzoni, Environmental Standing: Who Determines the Value of Other Life?, 18 DuKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'v F. 347, 348 (2008). However, some commentators defend the
standing doctrine, claiming that "recent [Supreme Court] decisions are continuous
with historical tradition." Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 15, at 713.
20 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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the divergence highlighted in this Note, creating an Article I tribunal
would inject political considerations back into the enforcement of
environmental statutes. 2 1 This would effectively undermine the purpose of citizen suits, and perhaps the effectiveness of environmental
law as a whole. 2 2 Therefore, this Note proposes that Congress grant
environmental resources the power to bring citizen suits, drawing
upon the paradigm of federally chartered corporations.
Part I of this Note gives a brief overview of the modern standing
doctrine. Part II analyzes the Endangered Species Act, 23 using stand-

ing disputes arising under its citizen suit provision to highlight the
divergence between its purpose and the injuries-in-fact required to
establish Article III standing. Part III advances two possible methods
through which Congress could heal the divergence. Part III.A discusses, and eventually dismisses, the idea of an Article I tribunal for
adjudication of environmental citizen suits, and Part III.B proposes
vesting environmental resources with the right to bring citizen suits to
enforce environmental statutes, drawing on the paradigm of federally
chartered corporations.
I.

THE MODERN DOCTRINE OF STANDING

Standing is "'among the most amorphous [concepts] in the
entire domain of public law."' 24 However, it has become a topic of
debate only recently, with the phrase first appearing in 1944 and the
vast majority of discussion occurring after 1970.25 The doctrine stems
from the "case or controversy" language of Article III, as well as upon
a "common understanding of what activities are appropriate . . . to
21 See infra Part III.B.3.
22 Cf James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at
30, 10 WIDENER L. REv. 1, 4-5 (2003) (noting that the number of citizen suits brought
under environmental statutes "easily outpaces EPA referrals for enforcement to the

U.S. Department of Justice").
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 86 (7th ed.
2006) (quoting JudicialReview: Hearings of S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 9th Cong., pt. 2, 498 (1966) (statement of Paul
A. Freund, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School)).
25 Sunstein, supra note 7, at 169. Some commentators suggest that the doctrine
of standing began taking shape in the 1920s and 1930s as a response to the fledgling
administrative state, although the first use of the word "standing," and the doctrine's
constitutional roots, occurred in 1944. See Benzoni, supra note 19, at 351-54. But see
Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 15, at 713 (contending that the constitutional
roots of the standing doctrine, although not expressed as such, stretch back to the
23

24

JOHN

early nineteenth century).

2196

NOTRE

courts." 26

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 84:5

In its most recent "phase,"27 the Supreme Court has

emphasized that the doctrine of standing is vital to maintaining the
separation of powers envisioned by the Constitution. 28 Although this
assertion has been thoroughly criticized by academics, 29 it seems that
the Court's conception of standing, and the requirements stemming
30
therefrom, will govern standing decisions for the foreseeable future.
To ensure that a dispute is a "case" or "controversy" under Article
III, a plaintiff must satisfy several constitutional and prudential standing requirements. Section A of this Part discusses the constitutional
requirements of standing: injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.
Section B notes some important prudential standing requirements,
highlights the important distinction between regulated parties and
parties seeking regulation of someone else, and discusses standing
requirements for associations and corporations.
A.

"Irreducible ConstitutionalMinimum" Requirements

In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,3 ' the Supreme Court enumerated
the "irreducible constitutional minimum" requirements of standing:
injury-in-fact, causation between the injury and alleged illegal conduct, and likelihood that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable
decision" in court.3 2 These elements ensure that the dispute before
the court is a "Case" or "Controversy"3 3 over which Article III grants
jurisdiction, restricting the judiciary to its constitutionally assigned
26 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); see also Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
472 (1982) ("[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the
court's authority to 'show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant."' (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979))); Ass'n of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970) ("[T]he question of standing in
the federal courts is to be considered in the framework of Article III which restricts
judicial power to 'cases' and 'controversies."').
27 Professor Sunstein has separated the Court's standing doctrine into five distinct phases. See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 168. For purposes of this Note, I only
discuss the most recent phase.
28 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559-60.
29 See, e.g.,
Jonathon R. Siegel, A Theory offusticiability, 86 TEX. L. REv. 73, 73-76
(2007); Sunstein, supra note 7, at 235-36.
30 For example, every case cited in this Note applied the standing framework set
forth in Lujan. Although the stringency with which those requirements were applied
varied, all the decisions at least purported to follow those requirements.
31

504 U.S. 555.

32
33

Id. at 560-61.
Id.
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role and preventing judicial intrusion on the purview of the political
branches.
1. Injury-in-Fact
In order to establish standing, a plaintiff must allege an "invasion
of a legally protected interest" which is both "concrete and particularized" and "'actual or imminent,"' as opposed to "'conjectural' or
'hypothetical.' "34 Thus, generalized grievances that affect every citizen's interest in proper application of the law, where the relief
requested does not tangibly benefit the plaintiff more than it does the
public at large, are not sufficient to convey standing.3 5 This requirement is based, in part, on a "common understanding of what activities
are appropriate . . . to courts. ' 6 Further, a plaintiff may not merely
assert that someone has suffered a cognizable injury; rather, the party
37
seeking review must "be himself among the injured."
The injury suffered by a plaintiff does not have to be particularly
egregious, and injuries to aesthetic, scientific, educational, or recreational interests are sufficient to grant standing.3 8 Thus, a plaintiff suffers an injury-in-fact when he is prevented from watching elephants at
a circus, 3 9 when he is a member of a bird-watching group with
reduced opportunities to view endangered raptors, 40 or when he is
41
prevented from recreating by a river because of a fear of pollution.
However, a plaintiff may not sue in court when he suffers no injury,
even when a defendant has clearly violated an environmental statute
42
by discharging toxic chemicals into a river.

34 Id. at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
35 Id. at 573-74.
36 Id. at 560.
37 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972) (emphasis added).
38 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 844-45 (9th Cir. 2002); see
also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-63 ("[T]he desire to use or observe an animal species,
even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of
standing.").
39 See Am. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. &
Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
40 See Nat'l Audubon Socy, 307 F.3d at 849.
41 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
181-82 (2000).
42 SeeVan Scoy v. Shell Oil Co., C94-3327 FMS, 1995 WL 232419, at *1 (N.D. Cal.,
1995), affd, 1996 WL 563449 (9th Cir., Oct. 2, 1996).
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Causation

To establish standing, the injury-in-fact suffered by the plaintiff
must be "'fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not the result of the independent action of some third party not
before the court. ' ' 43 Although the specific implications of this
requirement are not entirely clear, federal courts may not "raise the
standing hurdle higher than the necessary showing for success on the
merits in an action." 44 In the environmental context, plaintiffs may
satisfy the "causation" element of Article III standing by showing an
increased risk of environmental degradation which would result in an
injury-in-fact; the environmental damage need not have already
45

occurred.

3.

Redressability

To maintain an action in federal court, a plaintiff must show that
a favorable decision by the court is "'likely"' to redress the alleged
injury. 46 In other words, a court's decision must be binding on the
perpetrator of the injury, or otherwise compel the defendant to stop
the injurious activity. This element is particularly difficult to establish
when a plaintiff's relief depends upon the actions of an entity which is
not a party to the case. 47 Because a court decision would not legally
bind such an entity, the plaintiff can only speculate that a favorable
decision will remedy his injury. 48 For example, when a plaintiff claims
injury from violation of a treaty between the United States and

Canada, and the court cannot force Canada to comply with the treaty,
43

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.

26, 41-42 (1976)).
44 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181.
45 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149,
159-61 (4th Cir. 2000). The causation prong of the standing inquiry does not appear
to be particularly difficult to establish. In some environmental contexts, particularly
in determining whether a particular pollutant was the cause of environmental
destruction, the causation requirement may prove a substantial bar. The example of
global warming is illustrative. Because "any single polluter is likely to produce only a
tiny proportion of the [greenhouse gasses]," proving causation may cause serious
problems for plaintiffs bringing citizen suits. Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global
Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1, 6 (2005). These sorts of
problems, however, are outside the scope of this Note.
46 Lujan, 540 U.S. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38).
47 See id. at 568. This problem often arises, as in Lujan, when a government official is sued for failing to carry out some statutory duty, the completion of which does
not assure any particular outcome.
48 See id. at 568-69.

2009]

IF

AN

(ENDANGERED)

TREE FALLS

IN

THE FOREST

2199

the plaintiff lacks standing. 49 The redressability requirement can be
satisfied, however, where punitive fines would deter the defendant
from causing further injury in the future. 50 For example, a plaintiff
has standing when he seeks only punitive fines payable to the government. 5 1 Such fines are "likely" to deter the defendant from polluting,

thus remedying the plaintiffs injury and satisfying the redressability
52
requirement.
These constitutional requirements, although necessary, are not
always sufficient to convey standing. To protect the purpose of Article
III "to the extent necessary under the circumstances," courts have
established various prudential standing requirements. 53 These prudential requirements are discussed below, along with a discussion of
the heightened standing inquiry for parties seeking regulation of
someone else and standing requirements for associations.
B.

Prudentialand Other Concerns

In addition to the standing requirements which stem from Article
III, plaintiffs often must overcome various prudential barriers created
by the courts. 5 4 Depending on the particular injury the plaintiff is
asserting, and whether the plaintiff is a regulated party or one seeking
to compel regulation, standing may be more or less difficult to establish. Additionally, the standing requirements for associations or corporations differ slightly from those applicable to individuals.
1. Prudential Requirements
In addition to the "irreducible constitutional minimum" 55 elements of standing, a plaintiff often must overcome various prudential
standing requirements. 56 Courts will decline jurisdiction if the plain49 See Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220, 1226
(9th Cir. 2008).
50 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
174 (2000).
51 See id. at 185-87.
52 See id. at 187.
53 Sullivan v. Syracuse Hous. Auth., 962 F.2d 1101, 1106 (2d Cir. 1992).
54 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
55 Id.
56 See id.; Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500
(1975). Notably, "Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules." Warth, 422 U.S. at 501. In
environmental statutes with citizen suits, Congress has overridden prudential concerns. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164-65 (1997). Therefore, in this subsec-
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tiff does not assert his own legal rights and interests, but instead
"rest[s] his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." 57 Therefore, even when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury
from injury to a third party, a court may decline jurisdiction and dismiss the case. 58 Further, a plaintiff may be denied standing if he or
she asserts an interest which is "pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches."5 9 Thus, when an otherwise valid injury-in-fact is not unique or otherwise differentiated
from injury to the populace at large, a court may decline to hear the
suit.6 0 Lastly, if the harm asserted by the plaintiff does not fall within

"the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute... in
question, '

61

a court may not exercise jurisdiction. Although pruden-

tial standing requirements may be significant in some areas of law,
citizen suit provisions effectively negate their application. 6 2 Therefore, prudential barriers to standing do not play a significant role in
63
the context of environmental citizen suits.

2.

Regulated Parties Versus Parties Seeking Regulation

In Lujan, Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court, noted that the
"nature and extent of facts that must be averred.., in order to establish standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue. '64 If the
plaintiff is an object of regulation, standing is normally not difficult to
establish. 65 In contrast, if the plaintiff asserts injury arising "from the
government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of
someone else," standing "is ordinarily 'substantially more difficult' to
establish."

66

This distinction is particularly relevant for citizen suits. Citizen
suits are, by design, enforcement actions. Their purpose is to
decrease reliance on agency enforcement, thus avoiding problems of
tion, examples from nonenvironmental statutes are used to explain the prudential

requirements.
57

Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.

58

See id.

59

Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 475.

60

Id.

61 Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
62 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164-65 (1997) (discussing the inapplicability of these requirements to citizen suits initiated under the ESA).

63

Id.

64

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 540 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
Id. at 561-62.
Id. at 562 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975)).

65

66
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underenforcement. 67 Plaintiffs bringing enforcement actions, however, normally assert injury due to the government's failure to regulate a third party's activity. Therefore, in these cases standing is
"'substantially more difficult' to establish." 68 However, citizen suits
may also be brought to challenge existing regulations. 69 This type of
citizen suit is brought by "regulated parties" and thus standing is normally not difficult to establish. 70 This distinction adds somewhat to
the disconnect highlighted in this Note: those utilizing citizen suits in
the manner which they were intended, as enforcement actions, find it
more difficult to establish standing in Article III courts.
3.

Associational Standing

An association may bring suit if: (1) one of its members would
have standing in his or her own right; (2) if the interest the association seeks to protect is "germane to [its] purpose;" and (3) if "neither
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation
of individual members in the lawsuit."' 7 1 The first two prongs of the

test are grounded in the Article III case or controversy requirement,
but the third is merely a prudential limit imposed by courts. 72 Thus,
an association may have standing to assert the rights of its members
regardless of whether the association itself has any independent rights
or is empowered to sue in court. The ability to approach a court,
however, hinges on the ability of a group member to satisfy the nor73
mal standing requirements.
If statutorily empowered to do so, an association may be "entitled
to sue on [its] own behalf for injuries [it] ha[s] sustained. '74 Corporations are a typical example of such associations. Both federal and
state corporations are generally granted the power to "sue and be
sued," and thus may approach a court to vindicate contractual, statutory, or even constitutional rights.

75

Corporations and associations

67 See Cross, supra note 3, at 55.
68 Lujan, 540 U.S. at 562 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 505).
69 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1997).
70 Lujan, 540 U.S. at 561-62.
71 See, e.g., United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown
Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 553 (1996) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm'n,
432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
72 Id. at 555-56.
73 See, e.g.,
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-67; Disability Rights Wis., Inc. v. Walworth
County Bd. of Supervisors, 522 F.3d 796, 801-04 (7th Cir. 2008); Haw. County Green
Party v. Clinton, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1201-03 (D. Haw. 2000).
74 Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 n.19 (1982).
75 See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing federal corporations).
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are considered "persons" for purposes of environmental citizen suits,
and may initiate citizen suits in court. 76 Corporations must, however,
establish the Article III standing requirements vis-A-vis themselves as
77

entities.
Although the doctrine of standing remains controversial, 78 it is

fundamental to the judiciary's view of its proper role in the constitutional system of governance. In the context of environmental statutes,

where statutes protect environmental resources, standing requirements force plaintiffs to allege injury to themselves in addition to violations of the underlying statutes. 79 The resulting divergence of the
injuries required to establish standing and the harms which environmental statutes seek to prevent is discussed in the following section,
using standing decisions arising under the Endangered Species Act to
highlight the disconnect.
II.

ENDANGERED

SPECIES ACT: PURPOSE, STRUCTURE, AND STANDING

The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is representative of the statutes which constitute American environmental law. Passed to protect
"charismatic megafauna representative of our national heritage, ' 80
the ESA embodies a strong policy of federal protection for all species
threatened with extinction. The ESA contains a citizen suit provision,
under which "any person" can bring suit in court to enforce its substantive protections.8 1 Given the ESA's broad protection of endangered species, coupled with the citizen suit as an enforcement
mechanism, it is not surprising that standing under the ESA has been
thoroughly litigated. An analysis of the ESA and citizen suits brought
to enforce its provisions illustrates the disconnect between the purpose of the statute and the injuries-in-fact required to establish Article
III standing.
Subpart A of this Part analyzes the purpose of the ESA. Subpart B
discusses standing disputes under the ESA, giving concrete examples
of the disconnect between cognizable injury-in-fact and the substantive protections of the statute. Subpart C discusses the harmful effects
of the disconnect on plaintiffs, Congress, and the environment.
76
77
78

See, e.g., Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004).
See Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 377.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

79

See infra Part II.B.

80 Shannon Petersen, Note, Congress and CharismaticMegafauna:A Legislative History of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVrL. L. 463, 467 (1999).
81 16 U.S.C. § 154 0(g) (1) (2006).
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Purpose of the Endangered Species Act

The stated purpose of the ESA is to provide a means "whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved [and] to provide a program for the conservation of such.., species." 82 All federal departments and agencies are
required to "utilize their authorities in furtherance of' protecting
endangered and threatened species. 83 To this end, federal agencies
are subject to numerous procedural requirements, including
mandatory consultation with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure
agency actions do not jeopardize a species, 84 completion of biological
assessments to determine whether an endangered or threatened species is present in an area where construction is contemplated, 85 and a
prohibition on any "irreversible or irretrievable commitment of
resources" to projects which may jeopardize a threatened or endangered species. 86 The ESA also operates on private individuals and
entities, prohibiting "any person" from importing, exporting, transporting, or "taking" an endangered or threatened species.8 7 Viola88
tions of the ESA may result in civil or criminal penalties.
Courts have determined that the ESA embodies the "plain intent
of Congress . . . to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost."'89 Indeed, in Tennessee Valley Authority v.

Hill,90 the Supreme Court found that Congress spoke "in the plainest
of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance [of equities] has
been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of
priorities." 9 1 Accordingly, any agency action that jeopardizes an
endangered or threatened species may be enjoined, even at the cost
of tens of millions of taxpayer dollars. 9 2 Additionally, courts have
found it "obvious ...

from the scheme of the statute" that the statu-

tory protections of the ESA extend to endangered species themselves,
82 Id. § 1531(b).
83 Id. § 1531(c)(1).
84 Id. § 1536(a)(2).
85 Id. § 1536(c).
86 Id.§ 1536(d).
87 Id.§ 1538.
88 Id.§ 1540.
89 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
90 437 U.S. 153.
91 Id. at 194.
92 See, e.g., id. at 172-73 (enjoining the completion of a dam over part of the
Little Tennessee River at an expense of over $100 million, even though the dam was
nearly completed).
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and not to human persons. 93 Accordingly, commentators have classified the ESA as a codification of "environmental ethics," 94 and courts
have judged it to be the "most comprehensive legislation for the pres95
ervation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation.
Although the ESA extends protection to endangered species, only
human persons who suffer personal injury have standing to enforce its
protections via citizen suit. 96 Therefore, some harm outside the purpose of the statute must occur to permit enforcement in Article III
courts.
B.

Standing under the ESA

Standing under the ESA has been heavily litigated, and the ESA
has given rise to several of the seminal modern standing cases. 97 This
is hardly surprising given the ESA's protection of species and the judiciary's focus on injury to persons. Standing disputes under the ESA
are perfect examples of the disconnect between Congressional intent
and the Article III injury-in-fact requirement. The following sections
analyze standing under the ESA, beginning with the statute's citizen
suit provision. Section I.B.2 provides several examples of injuries
which failed to convey standing, and section I.B.3 analyzes several
cases in which the plaintiffs did manage to establish the requisite
injury-in-fact.
1.

Citizen Suit Provision

"Any person" may bring suit to enforce the provisions of the
ESA.98 A "person" is defined as, inter alia, "an individual, corpora99
tion, partnership, trust, association, or any other private entity.
This provision "eliminates any prudential standing requirements."' 0 0
However, to bring a citizen suit, plaintiffs must satisfy Article III's
93
94
95
96

Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004).
RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE 175 (1989).
Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 180.
See Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1177-78; see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing

injuries insufficient to grant standing).

97

See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555 (1992).
98 16 U.S.C. § 154 0(g) (2006).
99 Id. § 1532(13).
100 Am. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum &
Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 336 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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"irreducible constitutional minimum" requirements. 10 1 It is here that
the disconnect between the injury-in-fact requirement and congressional purpose appears: in order to enforce the ESA's protections, a
potential plaintiff must be able to show both that there has been a
violation of the statute and that the violation caused him a judicially
cognizable injury. Although the ESA protects endangered species,
only injury to human persons is sufficient to establish standing. Thus,
the harm which the ESA seeks to prevent is not itself sufficient to convey standing. Rather, some incidental injury to a human person must
occur to enable enforcement via citizen suit. 10 2 When such incidental

injury does occur, plaintiffs must posture their citizen suit in terms of
personal injury even when the lawsuit is motivated by a moral or ethical concern for endangered species or the environment itself. 10 3 Sev10 4
eral examples of asserted injuries-in-fact highlight this incongruity.
2.

Injuries Insufficient to Grant Standing

In Hawaii County Green Party v. Clinton,'05 the plaintiffs asserted,
inter alia, that the Navy violated the ESA by using sonar that injured
endangered aquatic species. 10 6 The sonar was used in international
waters.10 7. The Green Party's members used the waters surrounding
Hawaii, and the marine animals inhabiting those waters, for "scientific
study, whale watching, recreation, sport, food, and personal restora101 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 578 (1992) (holding that, because none of its
members satisfied Article III standing requirements, Defenders of Wildlife could not
bring suit under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA).
102 See infra Parts II.B.2-B.3.
103 See Lujan, 540 U.S. at 563 ("[The injury-in-fact test] 'requires that the party
seeking review be himself among the injured."' (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972))); Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739 ("Mere interest in a problem,
no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization
adversely affected or aggrieved." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Benzoni, supra
note 19, at 348 n.2 (noting that a plaintiff suing under the Animal Welfare Act could
not "argue that he suffered a moral or ethical injury by the [mistreatment of animals],
since the courts have not recognized such an injury" as sufficient to grant standing).
104 These cases deal with only the injury-in-fact prong of the Article III standing
requirements. Additionally, they are all examples of those seeking to compel regulation, as opposed to parties being regulated. As mentioned supra Part I.B.2, parties
seeking to compel regulation have a more difficult time establishing standing. These
cases, however, best illustrate the divergence of harms sought to be prevented by Congress with the injuries sufficient to convey standing.
105 124 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (D. Haw. 2000).
106 Id. at 1180.
107 Id. at 1202 & n.24.
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tion and healing."10 8 The Green Party, however, failed to allege that
those endangered species harmed by the Navy's sonar would have
entered the waters surrounding Hawaii. 10 9 Thus, the Green Party did
not assert a judicially cognizable injury-in-fact, and the group lacked
standing to sue.11 0 The disconnect is obvious: harm to endangered
species, which is the harm Congress sought to prevent in passing the
ESA, did not create an incidental injury to a human person, so the
Green Party could not enforce the substantive provisions of the ESA
via citizen suit.
Van Scoy v. Shell Oil Company,"' an unreported case from the
Ninth Circuit, tells a similar tale. In that case, Van Scoy alleged that
Shell discharged toxic chemicals into a river, harming several endangered bird and fish species in violation of the ESA. 112 He brought an
action under the ESA's citizen-suit provision, claiming that the discharge would result in decreased revenue for his fishing and wildlife
viewing business. 1 3 Van Scoy, however, did not own a boat from
which to operate such a business, nor did he have plans to obtain
at
one.1 4 Further, the evidence showed that he simply "was not really115
fishes]."
and
birds
endangered
all interested in [observing the
Therefore, Van Scoy suffered no personal injury from the alleged violation, and his case was dismissed for lack of standing. 1 16 Again, the
disconnect is evident: the harm which the plaintiff sought to enjoinharm to endangered species resulting from discharge of toxic chemicals-is a harm Congress sought to prevent in passing the ESA. However, the injury to the plaintiff-lost revenue for a nonexistent fishing
and wildlife viewing business-did not grant him standing to proceed
in an Article III court, and thus he could not bring a citizen suit to
enforce the ESA's statutory protections.
3.

Injuries Sufficient to Grant Standing

Cases in which plaintiffs did establish standing also illuminate the
disconnect between the courts' injury-in-fact analysis and the underlying substance of a claim. These cases demonstrate the manner in
which plaintiffs must couch their claims to exhibit proper injuries-in108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1203.
No. 95-15961, 1996 WL 563449 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 1996).
See id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
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fact, and how far a court's standing analysis may range from the purpose of the statute.
In National Audubon Society, Inc. v. Davis,'1 7 a case that "pit[ted]
bird-lovers, seeking to protect endangered and threatened species,
against fox-lovers, seeking to protect predators from inhumane traps,"
the plaintiffs challenged a California law which banned the use of leg
traps in California.1 18 They alleged that banning leg traps, which were
used to control foxes that preyed on endangered raptors, would result
in an increased number of predators and a corresponding increase in
deaths of raptors, all in violation of the ESA. 119 The Audubon Society
asserted that the increase in mortality would injure them by decreasing the opportunity to engage in "bird and wildlife observation,
nature photography, aesthetic enjoyment, and other scientific, educational, and recreational activities. '120 The Ninth Circuit held that this
injury was sufficient to grant Article III standing. 121 Thus, the disconnect appears again: a ban on leg traps that would lead to an increase
in predation of endangered species would harm an endangered species and thus was prohibited by the ESA. However, the incidental
injury which permitted the Audubon Society to enforce the ESA in
court, and enjoin the harm prohibited by the statute, was a decreased
chance to observe the endangered birds and other wildlife. 122
In American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling
Brothers & Barnum & Bailey Circus,123 the plaintiff claimed that
Ringling Brothers, who use endangered Asian elephants in their cir124
cus performances, abused the elephants in violation of the ESA.
Thomas Rider, a member of the Society, had been an elephant handler for Ringling Brothers and claimed that he could tell when an
elephant had been abused by observing its behavior. 125 Rider asserted
that he would like to view the elephants, but was prevented from
doing so by the pain of observing the elephants' tell-tale behavior.' 26
This, combined with a demonstrated desire and ability to view the elephants once the abuse had ceased, prompted the D.C. Circuit to find
117 307 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2002).
118 Id. at 842-43 (citing CIAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 3003.1-.2 (West 1998 & Supp.
2001)).
119 Id. at 845. The Audubon Society claimed that because of this conflict the ESA
preempted California law. Id.
120 Id. at 844-45.
121 Id. at 849.
122 Id.
123 317 F.3d 334 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
124 Id. at 335.

125
126

Id.
Id.
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Rider's injury "within decisions of... the Supreme Court recognizing
that harm to one's aesthetic interests in viewing animals may be a sufficient injury in fact. ' 127 Thus, the alleged violation of the ESA, mis-

treatment of an endangered species, could be enjoined by Article III
courts. Rider was granted standing by way of the incidental "aesthetic
and emotional injury" 128 stemming from his familiarity with elephant
behavior.
C. Anomaly and Effects
This collection of cases exposes the disconnect between the purpose of the ESA and the doctrine of standing. In each of the cases,
the injury-in-fact required to convey standing was separate and distinct
from the harm which threatened the species. Instead, the injury-infact was two steps removed from the protections afforded by the statute: the defendant violated the statute, which harmed or threatened
to harm an endangered species, which resulted in an incidental injury
to the plaintiff. 129 This disconnect has two major effects: (1) it prevents enforcement of violations whose effects are felt solely by the
environment, without incidental injury to third parties; and (2) it
forces plaintiffs to present their claims in a self-centered manner, disguising the ethical motives behind their claims and losing the rhetorical power of advocating for the environment itself. These outcomes
negatively affect all those involved in environmental legislation. They
are harmful to Congress, whose attempt to protect the environment
may be thwarted; harmful to the plaintiffs, who are prevented from
airing their ethical concerns about the environment; and harmful to
the environment, which may be destroyed due the inability of concerned citizens to assert a cognizable injury-in-fact.
In the first instance, violations of a statute which are sufficiently
isolated so as to destroy an environmental resource without causing
injury to persons cannot be enjoined by citizen suit. For example, one
can imagine Ringling Brothers abusing endangered elephants without
127 Id. at 336.
128 Id. at 335 (internal quotations omitted).
129 Notably, there does not necessarily have to be harm to the environment. For
example, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., the
majority found that the plaintiff had standing absent harm to the environment. 528
U.S. 167, 181 (2000) ("The relevant showing for Article III standing ... is not injury
to the environment but injury to the plaintiff."). In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas, stated that "[t]ypically, an environmental plaintiff claiming injury
due to discharges in violation of the Clean Water Act argues that the discharges harm
the environment, and that the harm to the environment injures him." Id. at 199
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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any person being injured. Likewise, statutory violations which occur
on large tracts of private land, access to which is limited to persons
complicit with the damage, could lead to environmental destruction
without fear of citizen suits. Although enforcement actions could still
be brought by the EPA, this defeats the purpose of the citizen-suit
provision, which was designed precisely to prevent reliance on agency
enforcement. 130 In these instances, if agency enforcement were foreclosed through "agency capture," lack of funding, or simply a dearth
of political will, a protected environmental resource may be destroyed
131
with impunity, no matter how stringent the statutory protection.
The second instance illustrates perhaps the greatest effect standing requirements have on environmental plaintiffs: they are forced to
couch their claims in terms of self-interest, as opposed to an ethical,
moral, or public interest in the environment itself. Thus, plaintiffs
appear to value the environment only insofar as its destruction affects
them. 13 2 For example, in the Ringling Brothers case, the American
Society for the Prevention of Animals was forced to base its claim on
the desire of Thomas Rider to view elephants in the circus, rather
than an ethical problem with the abuse itself.' 33 As pointed out by
Professor Benzoni, this shift in terms
can erode the very values that bring us to feel an obligation to ecosystems and other life. Even when one's concern with injury to
other life is ethical, to be legally cognizable it must be put in terms
of human injury, such as a recreational injury or an aesthetic injury,
130 See Cross, supra note 3, at 55.
131 The problems of agency capture, underfunding, and lack of political will are
cited by commentators as the cause of agency underenforcement. See David R.
Hodas, Enforcement of EnvironmentalLaw in a TriangularFederalSystem: Can Three Not Be
a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United States, the States, and Their
Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REv. 1552, 1624 (1995) (discussing agency capture); Alexandra B.
Klass, PunitiveDamages and Valuing Harm, 92 MINN. L. REv. 83, 126-27 (2007) (pointing to the ineffective enforcement policies, agency capture, accountability failures,
and inadequate funding); Sarah Wood Borak, Comment, The Legacy of "Deep Throat":
The Disclosure Process of the Whistleblower Protection Act Amendments of 1994 and the No
FEAR Act of 2002, 59 U. Mtxim L. Rv. 617, 625-26 (2005) (discussing agency
capture).
132 See Benzoni, supra note 19, at 350-51. This perception may spill over to affect
a court's balancing of equities in the context of preliminary injunctions. For example, in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008), the
Supreme Court weighed the interests of the Navy against the recreationalinterests of
the plaintiffs, instead of the interests of the public in the whales or other endangered
animals being injured. See id. at 377.
133 See Am. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. &
Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 336 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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which fundamentally distorts the ethical dimension of the exper13 4
ienced reality.

This harmful situation stems from Congress' choice of enforcement mechanisms. In choosing to protect the environment itself,
while placing enforcement power in the hand of individual citizens,
Congress has decided to protect a generalized interest in nonhuman
resources through an action which requires a particular, concrete
harm to a person or group of persons. 13 5 In order to remedy this
disconnect, while respecting Article III courts and their asserted role
in the constitutional system, Congress could either (1) remove the
standing inquiry completely, by providing an Article I tribunal, 136 or
(2) make citizen suits more like traditional "private rights" disputes by
granting environmental resources the power to sue on their own
37
behalf.
III.

RESOLVING THE DISCONNECT:

Two

POSSIBILITIES

Although Congress intended to enable "any person" to bring citizen suits to enforce environmental statutes, only those plaintiffs who
suffer cognizable injuries-in-fact satisfy Article III standing requirements. Thus, some plaintiffs are barred from court, despite the fact
that a violation of an environmental statute resulted in harm to the
134 Benzoni, supra note 19, at 351.
135 A plaintiff does not necessarily have to be a human person; a corporation may
bring suit under the ESA. See Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1177 (9th Cir.
2004). However, an association of nonhumans cannot bring a citizen suit under the
ESA. Id. at 1179.
136 Adjudication of citizen suits in Article I tribunals has been discussed by various
authors. For terrific overviews of the topic of Article I tribunals as a whole, see Nelson, supra note 17; James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals,Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARv. L. REV. 643 (2004). For an approach tailored
to solving standing problems in the context of citizen suits, see David Krinsky, How to
Sue Without Standing: The Constitutionalityof Citizen Suits in Non-Article III Tribunals,57
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 301 (2007), and for a discussion of their possible use in environmental litigation, see Timothy C. Hodits, Note, The FatalFlaw of Standing: A Proposalfor
an Article I Tribunalfor Environmental Claims, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 1907 (2006).
137 Granting standing to animals has been advocated in several articles. See, e.g.,
Cass R. Sunstein, Standingfor Animals (With Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. REv.
1333, 1359 (2000). In the context of the ESA, see Burke, supra note 9, at 655-65.
None of these articles, however, discuss the disconnect exhibited in this Note, and do
not contain a discussion of the "private" versus "public" rights adjudication. Katherine Burke's comment does contain a robust discussion of the procedures by which
attorneys could represent nonhumans via Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c), id. at
652-55, and Cass Sunstein's article covers a broad range of animal-welfare statutes,
including the ESA. See Sunstein, supra, at 1342-58.
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environment.13 8 Even when a plaintiff can satisfy the Article III injury-

in-fact requirement, he is still forced to couch his claim in terms of
personal interest, which lacks the rhetorical power of advocating for
the environment itself.' 39 Thus, the divergence of the Article III
injury-in-fact requirement and congressional purpose in environmental legislation causes substantial harm. In order to remedy this problem, without requiring the courts to re-think the doctrine of standing,
Congress should take action and heal this divergence.
As expressed in the doctrine of standing, courts view their primary role as adjudicating disputes between individuals, or "private
rights disputes." 40 In contrast, Congress attempted to vest ordinary
citizens with the power to enforce general "compliance with the
14 1
law[]," a role which is traditionally vested in the political branches.
Further, Congress extended protection to environmental resources,
142
while only granting standing to humans and groups of humans.
Accordingly, Congress could repair the divergence in one of two ways:
(1) provide a public rights forum by creating an Article I tribunal to
adjudicate environmental citizen suits, thus relieving plaintiffs of the
requirement to assert personal harm; or (2) convey standing to environmental resources, so that they may bring citizen suits alleging damage to themselves, thus making the proceeding mirror traditional
"private rights" disputes. Although Congress could permissibly create
an Article I tribunal to adjudicate environmental citizen suits, there
are poignant policy objections to its creation.' 43 Notably, these objections center around the independence of Article I tribunals, and are
substantially similar to the concerns Congress sought to solve by creating citizen suits. Therefore, an Article I tribunal is not the best manner in which to heal the disconnect highlighted in this Note. Rather,
Congress should grant environmental resources the limited right to
bring citizen suits, repairing the disconnect while maintaining
enforcement power outside the political branches.
Subpart A discusses the possibility of creating an Article I tribunal
for environmental citizen suits. Section A. 1 lays out permissible uses of
Article I tribunals, and suggests that an environmental tribunal would
be constitutional. Section A.2 discusses the strong objections to the
creation of an environmental tribunal, and section A.3 concludes that
138
139
140
141
142
143

See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See Nelson, supra note 16, at 566.
See Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2004).
See infra Part III.A.3.
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these objections undermine the entire purpose of creating citizen
suits, and accordingly rejects the creation of an Article I tribunal.
Subpart B of this Part advances the possibility of Congress granting environmental resources standing to sue. Section B.1 notes the
considerable support in case law for the proposition, while section B.2
provides a brief overview of federal corporations, a helpful paradigm
for granting non-humans the right to sue. Section B.3 details the specific proposal, including some suggested statutory language; section
B.4 notes some possible variations on the proposal; and section B.5
addresses potential objections to the proposal.
A.

Article I Tribunalfor Environmental Citizen Suits

In order to foster public involvement in enforcing environmental
legislation, while respecting the role of Article III courts as articulated
in the doctrine of standing, Congress could create an Article I tribunal for adjudication of environmental citizen suits. 14 4 In an Article I

tribunal, plaintiffs simply would not need to establish standing, and
therefore would have no need to assert injury to themselves. Thus,
plaintiffs could seek to prevent or remedy harms to the environment
itself, which comports with the congressional purpose of environmental legislation. Notably, the Article I tribunal would be particularly
appropriate for those plaintiffs disputing "the government's allegedly
unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else"' 45 for
whom standing in Article III courts is substantially more difficult to
establish.1 46 Shifting these types of disputes to an Article I tribunal
would be constitutional, as they fit tidily within a well established use
of Article I tribunals. 1 47 Disputes between private parties, where the
plaintiff is either a regulated party or is able to assert a cognizable
injury-in-fact, do not fit so cleanly within the historical uses of Article I
tribunals. Jurisdiction over these disputes, however, would likely be
constitutional, given the Supreme Court's functional approach in
determining the permissible jurisdiction of Article I tribunals.
144 I am certainly not the first to come up with this idea. See, e.g.,James Dumont,
Beyond Standing:Proposalsfor CongressionalResponse to Supreme Court "Standing"Decisions,
13 VT. L. REv. 675, 684-89 (1989); Krinsky, supra note 136; Hodits, supra note 136, at
1936-40.
145 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992).
146 Id.
147 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 (1982)
(establishing "public-rights" adjudications as a historical example of permissible Article I tribunals); Krinsky, supranote 136, at 323-24 (asserting that "citizen suits... fall
within the rubric of 'public rights'"); Hodits, supra note 136, at 1937 (arguing that
environmental claims fit the definition of public rights adjudications).
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Permissible Uses of Article I Tribunals

The extent to which Congress may vest jurisdiction in Article I
tribunals is not entirely clear. Indeed, case law involving Article I
tribunals is "as troubled, arcane, confused and confusing as could be
imagined."1 48 However, the Supreme Court has had occasion to discuss the outer bounds of permissible jurisdiction, which roughly correspond with the historical (although vague) distinction between
public and private rights.1 49 Generally, Article III courts are required
to adjudicate disputes involving "core 'private rights,"' such as the
protection of person and property while Article I tribunals may exer50
cise jurisdiction over rights "belonging to the body politic."
Although the public-versus-private rights distinction proves useful in
understanding generally what types of disputes may be adjudicated in
the political branches, recent decisions of the Supreme Court establish the tests to determine the permissible jurisdiction of Article I
tribunals.
The Court has rejected "bright-line tests" in determining whether
a particular dispute must be adjudicated in Article III courts. However, Supreme Court precedent provides two manners in which an
Article I tribunal could pass constitutional muster: (1) if the tribunal
adjudicates "public rights" cases, which are deemed a "historical use"
of Article I tribunals in the Northern Pipeline case,1 51 or (2) if the tribunal's jurisdiction passes the functional test handed down in Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.15 2 Interestingly, these two tests
correspond to the general configurations of environmental citizen
suits: private plaintiffs suing government officials, and private plain148 Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative
Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 239 (1990).
149 See, e.g.,
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847
(1986) (arguing that a non-Article III tribunal's jurisdiction must "be assessed by
reference to the purposes underlying the requirements of Article III"); Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985) (describing the recognition of non-Article III tribunals' decisionmaking authority); N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at
67-70 (plurality opinion) (discussing the historical development of the public-rights
doctrine); see also Nelson, supra note 16, at 594-624 (discussing these bounds).
150 Nelson, supra note 16, at 562.
151 See N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 63-64, 69 (plurality opinion).
152 See 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986). The Schor test could be seen as completely
replacing the Northern Pipeline "historical exceptions" analysis, and probably does.
However, the narrowness of Northern Pipeline's exceptions, and the fact that the Court
in Thomas and Schor permitted use of Article I tribunals that were broader than those
historical exceptions, suggests that if a tribunal fits into the Northern Pipeline definition, it will invariably pass the Schor factor test.
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tiffs suing another private party. 15 3 When a private plaintiff sues a government official for allegedly failing to carry out his or her statutory
duty, the plaintiff is asserting a right to "general compliance with regulatory law,"' 54 which fits cleanly with Northern Pipeline's definition of a
public rights dispute. 55 When a plaintiff sues a private defendant for
violation of an environmental statute, the suit does not necessarily fit
within this formalistic definition. However, this type of dispute would
likely pass the functional test handed down in Schor. These two tests,
and their application to an Article I tribunal for environmental citizen
suits, are discussed in turn below.
a.

"Public-Rights" Cases

In Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court laid out several "narrow
56
situations" in which jurisdiction may be vested in Article I tribunals. 1
One such situation is for the adjudication of "public-rights" disputes. 1 57 The doctrine of public rights, according to the plurality,
extends "only to matters arising 'between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of
[their legislative or executive duties],"' and only where the matter
could have been determined "exclusively by those departments."' 158
These matters are distinguished from disputes concerning "'the liability of one individual to another,"' which "lie at the core of the historically recognized judicial power" and may not be delegated to nonArticle III tribunals. 159 Obviously, a plurality opinion does not form
binding precedent. However, the other opinions in Northern Pipeline
deemed the plurality's view too restrictive. 160 Therefore, although the
"narrow exceptions" do not encompass the universe of permissible
jurisdiction for an Article I tribunal, it is safe to say there would be no
constitutional difficulty in vesting jurisdiction over "public rights"
cases in an Article I tribunal.
153 See Cross, supra note 3, at 55.
154 Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 15, at 693.
155 See N.Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 69 (plurality opinion) ("[A] matter of public rights
must at a minimum arise 'between the government and others.'" (quoting Ex parte
Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929))).
156 See id., 458 U.S. at 64-67.
157 For a more detailed account of the doctrine, see Nelson, supra note 16, at
563-64.
158 N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67-68 (plurality opinion) (quoting Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)).
159 See id. at 69-70 (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51).
160 See id. at 89-92 (Rehnquist,J., concurring); id. at 92 (Burger, CJ., dissenting);
id. at 92-118 (White, J., dissenting).
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When a private plaintiff sues an executive official alleging breach
of an environmental statute, as seen in Lujan or Tennessee Valley
Authority, the suit clearly falls within the public rights doctrine. In
Lujan, for example, the plaintiff asserted that the Secretary of the
Interior did not comply with his statutory duty to consult with the Fish
and Wildlife Service regarding a government-funded project that may
harm an endangered species. 16 1 Thus, the suit was against Lujan, a
person "'subject to [the Government's] authority"' in performance of
his official duties.1 62 Because Lujan was statutorily obligated to carry
out the consultation, the suit was over a matter which "could have
been determined exclusively by [his] department[ ].,,163 Therefore,
the suit in Lujan fits within the definition of a public rights dispute,
which Article I tribunals are permitted to adjudicate. Notably, this
pattern of citizen suit, where a plaintiff alleges unlawful failure to regulate someone else, are those in which standing is "'substantially more
difficult' to establish." 164 Ultimately, an Article I tribunal would be
particularly helpful in this context.
b.

Schor Factors

The Supreme Court has rejected "absolute construction[s] of
Article III," and has not viewed the "historical exceptions" enumerated in NorthernPipeline as capturing the universe of permissible jurisdiction for Article I tribunals. 1 65 Rather, whether an Article I tribunal
may adjudicate a particular dispute is determined by examining "the
purposes underlying the requirements of Article 11,'I66
which
demands protection of "the role of the independent judiciary within
the constitutional scheme of tripartite government.'

67

Thus, Con-

gress may not remove jurisdiction from Article III when doing so
threatens the "institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch." 68 A four
161 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 558-59 (1992).
162 N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 68 (plurality opinion) (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50).
163 Id.
164 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975)).
165 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985).
166 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847 (1986).
167 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 583. The Court is also concerned with "safeguard[ing]
litigants' 'right to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government."' Schor, 478 U.S. at 848 (quoting United
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)). This concern lies primarily with adjudication
of personal interests, see id., and is therefore relevant to this discussion only to the
extent that the proposed tribunal would exercise jurisdiction over claims affecting
such rights.
168 Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
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factor test, laid out in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,
determines when the integrity of the judicial branch is threatened.
The factors are: (1) "the extent to which 'the essential attributes of
judicial power are reserved to Article III courts;" 16 9 (2) "the extent to
which the non-Article III forum exercises the range ofjurisdiction and
powers normally vested only in Article III courts;" (3) "the origins and
importance of the rights to be adjudicated;" and (4) "the concerns
17
that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III." 0
Disputes between private individuals, brought under citizen-suit
provisions of environmental statutes, would likely pass Schor's second
factor. As exhibited in this Note, 1 7 1 disagreements about standing
are, in essence, disputes about whether Article III courts can, or
should, exercise jurisdiction over citizen suits between private parties. 172 Some Justices see no problem in exercising jurisdiction over
citizen suits, while others would presumably be more than willing to
see jurisdiction over citizen suits vested outside of Article 111.173 However, even those Justices willing to exercise jurisdiction over citizen
suits would not consider them to lie within the "range of jurisdiction
and powers normally vested only in Article III courts.' 1 74 The fact that
citizen suits were not prevalent until the 1970s, 1 75 combined with the
apparent willingness to respect congressional intent, demonstrates
that there would probably be no constitutional objection to an environmental tribunal on the basis of Schor's second factor.
Additionally, it could be (and is) argued that the only reason
environmental plaintiffs phrase their lawsuits in terms of private rights
is precisely because of standing requirements, with which the environ169 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) This factor examines the "oversight" of
an Article III court. Obviously, this factor depends on the precise details of the proposed tribunal. Because the proposal for an Article I tribunal is rejected, see supra
Part II.A.3, Schor's first factor is not analyzed in this Note.
170 Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
171 See supra Part II.B.
172 This debate is seen in the majority opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 559-62 (1992), as well as in justice Scalia's dissent in Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 198-215 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). To be sure, some Justices do not seem to have any hesitation in exercising jurisdiction over citizen suits. However, this is not to say that these suits are
deemed to be at the core of the judicial function.
173 Compare Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180-88 (asserting a broader view of standing in
citizen suits), with id. at 198-215 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (applying a strict view of standing to citizen suits).
174 Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
175 Citizen suits in environmental and other statutes were not prevalent until the
1970's, although enforcement actions by citizens-actions qui tam-date to much
earlier. See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 175-76.
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mental tribunal would dispense.1 76 In other words, once plaintiffs are
not required to demonstrate a "particularized" injury to their personal
interests, they would posture their complaint as genuine public rights
disputes, thus shedding any resemblance to private rights. For example, in the Ringling Brothers case, 1 77 Thomas Rider would not have to
seek redress of his inability to view the circus. Rather, the Society
could simply assert their general interest in having Ringling Brothers
follow the ESA, perhaps seeking an injunction to the abusive practice
and punitive fines to be paid to the government. 178 Thus, it is likely
that the suits over which the proposed tribunal would exercise jurisdiction would cease to mirror private rights disputes, again weighing
in favor of its constitutionality according to Schor's second factor.
The third factor of the Schor test considers the "origins and
importance of the right. 1

79

To the extent "rights" are created in envi-

ronmental law, their origins are clearly in federal statutes, as opposed
to being rooted in the common law or State legislation.' 8 0 When
plaintiffs sue for enforcement of environmental statutes, they do not
claim that the alleged perpetrator is liable to them, or has violated their
rights, so much as they claim that the alleged perpetrator should be
enjoined from harming the environment.18' Additionally, note that the
plaintiffs in many environmental cases do not ask the court to redress
176 See Benzoni, supra note 19, at 350-51 (noting that "[t]he current standing doctrine ... forces environmentalists to couch their claims in terms of human self-interest," although suits may be initiated because environmentalists "feel an obligation to
ecosystems and other life").
177 See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
178 In Laidlaw, the Supreme Court held that punitive fines were a sufficient deterrent to redress the plaintiff's injury. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 192-93. This was the
source of controversy. See id. at 202-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, if this case
were adjudicated in an Article I tribunal as a public rights case, then the "redressability" inquiry would be dispensed with, and there would be no controversy.
179 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
180 For example, think about the Endangered Species Act. It does not so much
create a right in a particularparty to be free from another party's "taking" of an endangered animal. Rather, it can either be seen as creating a right for everyone to be free
from such taking, or as creating a right for everyone to accrue the benefits of bio
diversity.
181 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 558-59 (1992) (seeking
an injunction requiring the Secretary of the Interior to issue regulations requiring
compliance with the ESA's consultation provisions for U.S. agencies funding projects
overseas); Am Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum
& Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 335-36 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (seeking an injunction against
future violations of the ESA and for forfeiture of the endangered species); Sw. Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1071 (D. Ariz. 2000) (seeking an order to enjoin the Forest Service from issuing a grazing permit until consultation requirements of the ESA are complied with).
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the injury which grants them standing; rather, they pray that the activity which harms the environment be enjoined. 182 Therefore, the origins of rights created by environmental statutes, and their
importance, weighs in favor of the constitutionality of an environmental tribunal.
Schor's final factor weighs "the concerns that drove Congress to
depart from the requirements of Article III. '' 183 This factor is aimed at
determining whether "Congress has ... attempted to 'withdraw from

judicial cognizance'" part of Article III courts' jurisdiction.1 8 4 In this
instance, the motivating factor behind creation of the environmental
tribunal is to move an enforcement mechanism (the citizen suit),
which the courts have found difficult to handle, into the legislative
branch. In essence, Congress would be recognizing that Article III
courts are not constitutionally permitted to adjudicate citizen suits to
the fullest extent. In other words, Congress' motive would not be to
strip Article III courts of jurisdiction, but rather to respect the judiciary's traditional role by providing a public rights forum for public
rights disputes. Thus, it appears as though an Article I tribunal could
exercise jurisdiction over citizen suits brought to enforce environmental statutes. 18 5 There are, however, serious and damaging policy arguments against creating such a tribunal. These arguments are
addressed below.
2.

Objections

The scope of permissible jurisdiction which may be vested in Article I tribunals is determined by a functional test, and is actually quite
expansive. Thus, an Article I tribunal for adjudication of citizen suits
would probably be constitutional. However, there are many strong
policy arguments against the idea. Article Ijudges lack life tenure and
salary protection, and are generally seen as less independent than
their counterparts in Article III courts. 186 Additionally, there are serious critiques of the independence of Article I tribunals and other specialized courts.' 8 7 The environmental tribunal, as a specialized Article
I court, would be vulnerable to all of these criticisms.
182 See sources cited supra note 129.
183 Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
184 Id. at 854-55 (quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856)).
185 See sources cited supra note 136.
186 See, e.g.,
Richard B. Hoffman & Frank P. Cihlar, JudicialIndependence: Can It Be
Without Article III?, 46 MERCER L. REV. 863, 865-68 (1995).
187 See RCHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 244-70 (1999).
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Article I judges of the proposed environmental tribunal would
lack the "bedrock" characteristics of Article III independence: life tenure and salary protection. 188 Thus, there would be strong disincentives for them to make politically unpopular decisions. Although
there is evidence to suggest that life tenure does not result in considerable differences in decisionmaking, 1s9 and that some Article I
judges are effectively insulated from direct coercion, 190 it is certainly
true that Article I judges appear or are regarded as less than independent-and the "appearance ofjustice remains a critical factor" in the
adjudicative process.1 91 Because the arena of environmental law is
such a politically charged field, 192 the perception of bias in an environmental tribunal would likely be much stronger than in, say, the
United States Tax Court. 9 3 This perceived lack of independence
would be a large hurdle to overcome, and the decisions of the tribunal would probably be heavily criticized on this basis, no matter
whether the decision is perceived as unduly favoring environmental or
business interests.
Apart from critiques surrounding the independence of the individual judges, Article I tribunals are perceived to be subject to systematic or institutional bias, be it through "agency capture" or political
influence.1 94 Although Article I courts are not standard agencies, they
are still vulnerable to "agency capture," which occurs when a regulating or enforcement agency develops "a policy bias in support of
[the] . . . regulated [interest]."

1

95

An environmental tribunal would

see many repeat players, most likely consisting of members of a partic188 Bruce A. Carroll, The PossibleImpact of Article I Judges: Collective Analysis ofJudicial
Decision Making Between Article I and Article 1Judges, 15 TRINITY L. REv. 50, 50 (2008).
189 See generally id. (concluding that the decisions of magistrate judges, who do not
have life tenure, do not differ significantly from their Article III colleagues).
190 See Hoffman & Cihlar, supra note 186, at 864 (noting that some administrative
law judges and Article I judges are regarded as being "imbued with the essential elements ofjudicial independence").
191 Id. at 867.
192 See POSNER, supra note 187, at 254 (describing the "fierce divisions in environmental law").
193 See Hoffman & Cihlar, supra note 186, at 869-73 (putting forward the Tax
Court as a model of a successful Article I court).
194 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 187, at 254 (noting that "the officials who appoint
judges [to specialized courts] will be better able to use the appointments process to
shape the court"); Hodas, supra note 131, at 1624 (noting that Congress sought to
avoid agency capture by preventing the regulated community from "us[ing] enforcement fora to debate, litigate or even raise economic efficiency issues that EPA
resolved in its regulations"); Borak, supra note 131, at 625-26 (describing the problem of "agency capture").
195 See Borak, supra note 131, at 625-26.
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ular regulated industry. This regulated industry could organize itself
in a cohesive manner, arguing before the tribunal in a coherent, coordinated, and organized fashion.1 9 6 Over time, it is possible that this
sustained, well-organized, and well-funded voice would sway the tribunal, leading to systematic bias in favor of the industry. 19 7 In other
words, the tribunal could become a political forum in which the regulated community could "debate, litigate [and] ...raise economic efficiency issues," and possibly accept these arguments, even if Congress
had previously made a determination of the proper balance between
efficiency and environmental protection. 198 Notably, this capture
could swing either way: if the business sector was more organized and
consistent, it could persuade the tribunal to be biased in its favor; if,
however, environmental groups were able to organize and strategically
bring citizen suits, making the same arguments, the tribunal could be
captured in their favor.
As a specialized court, the proposed environmental tribunal
could be manipulated by political processes more easily than the
generalist Article IIIjudiciary. 199 As noted by Judge Posner, experts in
a particular field such as environmental law are often divided into discrete "camps," each of which represents the "divisions in ethical, political, and economic thought" of the field.20 0 By ascertaining to which
"camp" a potential nominee adheres, the body appointing judges to a
tribunal can easily predict the outcomes of a nominee's future decisions, thus increasing the ability to appoint judges to achieve particular policy outcomes. 20 1 Additionally, because the subject matter is
limited, the decisions of a specialized court are easy to monitor, enabling Congress to "control or at least influence" the tribunal "through
' 20
the appropriations process."

196

See MANCUR

OLSON,

2

THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 141-48 (1971) (describ-

ing how business interests can organize themselves to influence politics).
197 See Hodas, supra note 131, at 1624 n.37 (citing KEITH HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT
AND ENFORCEMENT 3 (1984)).
198 Id.; see also POSNER, supra note 187, at 255 (noting that the Commerce Court
was abolished after three years of existence because "the court was thought to have
been 'captured' by the railroads"). One could imagine, for example, the adjudication
of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill had it been in an agency. See supra note 92. If an
agency was repeatedly forced to enjoin multi-million dollar projects, and was constantly assailed by inefficiency arguments, perhaps the agency would eventually give in
and thus underenforce the ESA.
199 See POSNER, supra note 187, at 251.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 254.
202 Id.
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In addition to concerns about the independence of an environmental tribunal, there are doubts as to its ability to issue binding judgments, 20

3

the required scope of Article III review, 20 4 and other

separation of powers concerns. 20 5 Further, the creation of a tribunal,
most likely based in Washington, D.C., would lead to a geographical
concentration of power and a corresponding decrease in its availabil20
ity as a national forum.

6

These objections to an Article I tribunal for adjudication of environmental citizen suits are strong, and probably valid. In fact, these
concerns are similar to those which drove Congress to permit citizen
suits in the first place. 20 7 Citizen suits were designed to take enforcement power out of the political branches, remedying the problem of
underenforcement caused by agency capture, under funding, and
general political pressure. 208 To insert these problems back into the
mix, through the forum in which enforcement takes place, makes little sense.
3.

Conclusion

An Article I tribunal to adjudicate citizen suits brought under
environmental statutes would probably be constitutional, and would
heal the disconnect between the Article III injury-in-fact requirement
and congressional purpose in environmental legislation. 20 9 In such a
tribunal, plaintiffs bringing citizen suits would not be required to
assert a cognizable injury to themselves, and thus could couch their
claims in terms of the harm to the environment. However, there
would be serious concerns with the tribunal's independence, both as
to individual judges and to the institution itself.2 10 Additionally, the
permissible scope of the tribunal's power is unclear. Most importantly,
creation of an Article I tribunal seriously undermines the very purpose
203
204
205

206
207
208

See
Id.
See
See
See
See

Krinsky, supra note 136, at 306, 310.
at 213-16.
id. at 317-23.
POSNER,

supra note 187, at 258.

Cross, supra note 3, at 55-56; Klass, supra note 131, at 126-28.
Barry Breen, Citizen Suits for NaturalResource Damages: Closing a Gap in Federal EnvironmentalLaw, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 851, 872-73 (1989) (noting Congress'
intent to use citizen suits as "an alternativeto government enforcement when it is lax
or stretched too thin"); Cross, supra note 3, at 56 (arguing that citizen suits "may
replace deficient programs of administrative enforcement"); Klass, supra note 131, at
126-28 (explaining how patterns of administrative behavior led to the establishment
of citizen suits).
209 See supra Part I.C for a discussion of this disconnect.
210 See supra Part III.A.2.
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of citizen suits as an enforcement mechanism, which were designed to
"replace deficient programs of administrative enforcement." 21 1
Through an Article I tribunal, concerns about agency capture, bias,
and general political pressures are reintroduced into the enforcement
equation, undermining the ingenuity and effectiveness of citizen suits.
Therefore, ultimately an Article I tribunal would not be the best manner in which to remedy the disconnect highlighted in this Note.
Fortunately, an Article I tribunal is not the only solution to the
disconnect between the Article III injury-in-fact requirement and the
purpose of environmental legislation. Granting standing to environmental resources would both heal the disconnect and maintain
enforcement power outside of the political branches. This would
maintain the logic behind citizen suits, while overcoming the standing
hurdle thrown up by Article III courts. In subpart B I propose the
idea of granting standing to environmental resources.
B.

Standingfor Environmental Resources

The most effective way for Congress to enforce environmental
protections, while preserving enforcement in Article III courts, is to
212
grant protected resources the right to sue on their own behalf.
Thus, the standing inquiry would mirror that under normal, humancentric statutes: the plaintiff would have to show a violation of the
statute which resulted in harm to him (or, in this case, it), causation
between the defendant's conduct and resultant injury, and that a
favorable court decision would redress the injury. 213 Therefore, the
211 See Cross, supra note 3, at 56.
212 See sources cited supra note 137 for other discussions of this same topic.
213 Some "traditional," human-centric statutes, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, may be enforced by citizen suits. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12188(a) (1) (2006) (permitting "any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability"
to bring suit under the statute). There are certainly standing disputes under the
ADA. See, e.g., Disability Rights Wis., Inc. v. Walworth County Bd. of Supervisors, 522
F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2008) (denying standing to an organization where none of its
members had been adversely affected by the allegedly illegal building of a school for
disabled children); Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc., 548
F. Supp. 2d 723, 726 n.5 (D. Ariz. 2008) (discussing the plaintiff-intervenor's lack of
standing to challenge the conditions of a movie theatre they had not entered). These
disputes center around whether the plaintiff received a cognizable injury-in-fact. Disability Rights Wis., 522 F.3d at 801; HarkinsAmusement, 548 F. Supp. 2d at 726 n.5. The
relevant injury in these cases, however, is the injury which is prevented by the statute:
discrimination. In other words, the standing inquiry merely determines whether the
harm sought to be prevented by the statute occurred; the relevant question is whether
a disabled person was actually discriminated against. In contrast, the standing inquiry
in environmental legislation hinges upon whether the plaintiff has suffered an injury
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type of harm which the statute seeks to prevent, injury to the environment, would be sufficient to grant standing to an entity with the power
to sue. In this manner, the protections afforded by environmental
statutes would no longer be in tension with the traditional role of the
judiciary: the plaintiff would seek redress of an injury to itself, which
occurred due to violation of a statute.
Empowering environmental resources to appear in court seems
absurd at first blush; could a court announce the case of "Denizens of
the Okefenokee Swamp v. John Doe" 2 14 with a straight face? Plus,
how exactly would an environmental resource show up to argue its
case? Our legal system, however, already has cognizance over claims
made by nonhuman entities. 215 Most notable are claims involving corporations, associations, or even ships in the context of admiralty
law.2 1 6 In addition, persons who are unable to express themselves or

otherwise appear in court, such as juveniles or incompetent adults, are
not completely barred from the judicial system.2 17 Rather, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) creates a means by which disabled parties' rights may be represented in court.2 1 8 Therefore, the fact that
environmental resources are not human and cannot actually appear
in court does not form a per se bar from the legal system.
This subpart discusses the possibility of Congress granting standing to environmental resources, thus empowering them to bring citizen suits to enforce environmental laws. Section B.1 explores the
courts' apparent willingness to adjudicate disputes between environmental resources and persons. Section B.2 discusses the paradigm of
federally chartered corporations, and notes how this familiar model
provides valuable precedent for Congress creating legal entities to
achieve particular policy goals. Section B.3 details the precise proposal, and section B.4 raises, and attempts to resolve, possible objections.

separate and apart from those harms which the statutes seek to prevent. See supraPart
II.B.
214 This is an entirely contrived name, although the Okefenokee Swamp is a
National Wildlife Refuge in Southeast Georgia. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Okefenokee National Wildlife Refuge, http://www.fws.gov/okefenokee/ (last visited March
16, 2009).
215 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 742 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation").
216
649.

See id. at 741-43; Sunstein, supra note 137, at 1360-61; Burke, supranote 9, at

217

Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004).

218

See Burke, supra note 9, at 652 (citing and quoting FED. R. Cirv. P. 17(c)).
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1. Support in Case Law
The possibility of environmental resources having standing to sue
has surprising support in case law. 2 19 Perhaps the strongest language

in support of granting standing to environmental resources comes
from Justice Douglas' dissent in Sierra Club v. Morion.2 20 In that case, a
majority of the Supreme Court affirmed a Ninth Circuit decision holding that the Sierra Club lacked standing to enjoin development of a
ski resort in the Mineral King Valley of central California. The Sierra
Club "failed to allege that it or its members would be affected ...

by

the... development," and thus failed to establish an Article III injuryin-fact. 2 21 In dissent, Justice Douglas passionately argued that, just as
other nonpersons such as corporations or ships can be parties to
22 2
litigation,
[s]o it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes,
estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air
that feels the destructive pressures of modern technology and modern life. The river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life it
sustains or nourishes-fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter,
fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including man, who
are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life.
The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part
of it.

223

Due to the values an environmental resource could assert, if permitted to do so, Justice Douglas advocated a "simplified" rule of standing that "allowed environmental issues to be litigated ...in the name
of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by
roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public outrage." 22 4 This rule would result in "the conferral of standing upon

environmental objects to sue for their own preservation."' 225 In fact,
Justice Douglas makes essentially the same observation as many con219 Although there appears to be only one case holding that the objects of environmental regulation have standing to sue, see Marbled Murrelet v. Pac. Lumber Co., 880
F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (N.D. Cal. 1995) abrogated in part by Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386
F.3d 1169, other courts have indicated, indicta, either that such objects have standing
under current environmental legislation, see Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural
Res., 852 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1988), or that Congress could convey standing on
such objects if they so desired, see Cetacean Cmty. 386 F.3d at 1176.
220 405 U.S. at 741 (1972).
221 Id. at 735.
222 Id. at 742 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
223 Id. at 743.
224 Id. at 741.
225 Id. at 742.
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temporary environmental advocates: environmental resources, as
such, have an ability to "speak for the ecological unit of life" in a manner beyond the ability of a human plaintiff.22 6 Although Justice Doug-

las advocated a judicially created grant of standing, his reasoning
certainly recognizes the power of Congress to convey standing to environmental resources.
Even without a statutory grant of standing or a Justice Douglaslike judicial rule, a substantial number of cases have proceeded with
an environmental resource as the named plaintiff.22 7 Although the

resources are not the actual party at interest, but are rather designated the head plaintiff for ethical or strategic purposes, 228 these
cases show that it would not be completely foreign for an environmental resource to bring suit on its own behalf. More on point, the Northern District of California held in Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber
Co. 229 that the marbled murrelet, an endangered bird, had "standing

to sue 'in its own right"' under the ESA.2 30 Along these lines, the
Ninth Circuit has stated that the palila, a member of the endangered
honeycreeper family, has the legal capacity to "wing[I] its way into federal court as a plaintiff in its own right."23 1 This language has since
been superseded by later cases, and dismissed as mere rhetorical
flourish. 232 These cases do exhibit, however, that courts do not view
nonhumans as absolutely barred from the courtroom. Rather, they
226 Id. at 743. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of
how environmental resources best represent the ethical values of environmental
protection.
227 See, e.g., Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004); Hawksbill Sea
Turtle v. FEMA, 126 F.3d 461 (3d Cir. 1997); Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural
Res., 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988); Marbled Murrelet v. Pac. Lumber Co., 880 F.
Supp. 1343 (N.D. Cal. 1995) abrogated in part by Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d
1169; Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 896 F. Supp. 1170
(M.D. Fla. 1995); Hawaiian Crow ('Alala) v. Lujan, 906 F. Supp. 549 (D. Haw. 1991).
However, when the standing of the species was challenged in Hawaiian Crow, the
animal was removed as a plaintiff. See Hawaiian Crow, 906 F. Supp. at 551-52.
228 J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 896
(2008).
229 880 F. Supp. 1343.
230 Id. at 1346 (quoting Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, No. C-93-1400-FMS, slip op.
at 9 n.4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 1993)) abrogatedin part by Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d
1169 (9th Cir. 2004).
231 Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir.
1988), abrogated in part by Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d 1169.
232 See Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1178 (holding that the Endangered Species Act
does not grant endangered animals the right to sue on their own behalf); Hawaiian
Crow, 906 F. Supp. at 552 n.2 (categorizing the quoted language in Palila as mere
rhetorical flourish).
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express a distinctive willingness to embrace environmental resources
as plaintiffs.
Bolstering this point, recent cases have denied standing to environmental resources based solely on statutory interpretation. In Cetacean Community v. Bush, the Ninth Circuit held that although "it is
obvious" that "animals are the protected [objects of the ESA]," Congress did not intend to grant endangered species standing to sue. 233
However, the court saw
no reason why Article III prevents Congress from authorizing a suit
in the name of an animal, any more than it prevents suits brought

in the name of artificial persons such as corporations, partnerships
or trusts, and even ships, or ofjuridically incompetent persons such
as infants, juveniles, and mental incompetents. 23 4
This apparent willingness to support a Congressional grant of
standing is mirrored by a case arising under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation, Inc. v. New
England Aquarium. 2 35 In that case, the District of Massachusetts

denied standing to Kama, a dolphin, stating that "[i]f Congress and
the President intended to take the extraordinary step of authorizing
animals as well as people and legal entities to sue, they could, and
should, have said so plainly.

'236

From these cases, it is obvious that Congress has not granted environmental resources the capacity to sue. It is equally obvious that
environmental resources are not barred from court solely because of
their status as nonhumans; rather, they cannot sue because they lack
the requisite statutory grant of standing. 23 7 Repeatedly, courts refer
to other nonhuman persons which are granted legal rights. 238 Among

these nonhuman entities are corporations. Below is a brief overview
of federal corporations, followed by a discussion of how Congress can
draw upon this paradigm to empower environmental resources to
bring citizen suits under environmental statutes.

233 Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1177-78.
234 Id. at 1176.
235 836 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1993).
236 Id. at 49.
237 See Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1177-78.
238 See, e.g.,
id. at 1178.
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An Existing Paradigm: Federally Chartered Corporations

Since the early days of the Republic, Congress has created corporations as a means of obtaining various policy goals. 239 These corporations, created by federal charter, are vested with whatever powers
Congress deems necessary to achieve their ends. 240 Generally, these
powers include the power to sue and be sued in federal court. 241 The

paradigm of federal corporations is instructive, as it reveals a well
established history of creating nonhuman, legal "persons," complete
with the power to sue, to further particular policy goals. Additionally,
federal corporations establish that certain entities may have statutory
rights which are separate and distinct from the rights of its
members.

242

Congress has created federal corporations to pursue a wide range
of policy goals, from building and managing dams on the Mississippi
River to providing mentors to socially and economically challenged
individuals. 243 To fulfill their designated purpose, each corporation is
granted a detailed and unique set of purposes, powers, and restrictions. 2 44 Because there is no federal incorporation statute, each corporation is formed by a separate piece of legislation, in which
Congress details the precise legal capacities of each. 24 5 Thus, Con-

gress controls every legal capacity of a corporation and often explicitly
24 6
prohibits corporations from engaging in certain activities.
Two examples highlight the variety of purposes for which federal
corporations are created, and the extent of congressional control over
their precise legal capacities. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
was created in 1933 for the purpose of improving navigation, fostering
industrial development, and controlling the destructive flood waters
239 See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 767
(1824) ("'[Corporatons] posses[] only those properties ... as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created."' (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth
Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819))); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 317-18 (1819) (describing the Bank of the United States and its

powers).
240
TERs

See KEVIN R. KosAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL OR FEDERAL CHAR-

2 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22230.pdf.

241
242
243
U.S.C.

244
245
246

See, e.g., Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 805.
See infra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
See 16 U.S.C. § 831 (2006) (creating the Tennessee Valley Authority); 36
§ 30101 (2006) (creating Big Brothers-Big Sisters of America).
See KOsAR, supra note 240, at 2.

See id. at 3.
See, e.g., 36 U.S.C. § 30107 (2006) (listing restrictions on the power of Big

Brothers-Big Sisters).
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of the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers. 247 To achieve this end, the
TVA is granted strikingly broad powers, including the power to exercise eminent domain, construct dams, assist in the relocation of populations disturbed by construction activities, and even conduct law
enforcement duties. 248 The TVA is a "wholly owned government corporation," and thus is legally considered an agent of the United
24 9
States.
250
Federal corporations may also be created in the private sector.
In contrast to the TVA's broad, quasi-governmental purpose and powers, so-called Title 36 Corporations are created for "the promotion of
patriotic, charitable, educational, and other eleemosynary activities. '25 1 Big Brothers-Big Sisters of America, chartered in 1998 as a
Title 36 Corporation, is created to "assist individuals throughout the
United States in solving their social and economic problems and in
their health and educational and character development." 25 2 To this
end, the corporation may sue and be sued, borrow money, make contracts, and acquire property. 253 Notably, the enabling legislation for

Big Brothers-Big Sisters contains explicit restrictions on the organization's power. The entity is not permitted to issue stock, contribute
254
to candidates for public office, make loans, or distribute its income.
Thus, Big Brothers-Big Sisters is chartered for a relatively narrow
purpose, and is vested with correspondingly narrow powers.
Like corporations created under state law, federally chartered
corporations have a legal existence separate both from the body
which created it and from its individual members. 255 Indeed, "incorporation's basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with legal
rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the
256
natural individuals who created it, who own it, or whom it employs."
Accordingly, if permitted by the enabling statute, corporations may
247
248
249

16 U.S.C. § 831 (2006).

See id.
31 U.S.C. § 9101(3)(N) (2006); KEVIN R. KOsAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 5-6 (2009), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/
rpts/RL30365 20090107.pdf.
250 Id. at 2-3 (discussing privately-owned, government-sponsored enterprises like
Fannie Mae).
251 See RONALD C. MOE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONALLY CHARTERED
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS ("TITLE 36 CORPORATIONS") 1 (2004), available at http://
www.llsdc.org/attachments/wysiwyg/544/CRS-RL30340.pdf
252 See 36 U.S.C. § 30102(1) (2006).
253 See id. § 30105.
254 See id. § 30107.
255 See KOSAR, supra note 249, at 6.
256 Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001).
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vindicate their rights in court.25 7 The corporation need not allege
injury to its individual members; rather, corporations are "entitled to
sue on their own behalf for injuries they have sustained. ' 258 Thus,

despite the fact that corporations are non-human, "artificial being [s]
. ..existing only in contemplation of law," courts have cognizance

over suits by, against, and between corporations, and the rights vindicated by a corporation may be separate and distinct from those adhering to its members.

2 59

This brief overview of federally chartered corporations underscores Congress' ability to create legal entities narrowly tailored to a
particular policy goal. Historically, Congress has harnessed this power
to pursue a variety of ends. Article III courts have cognizance over
suits brought by these entities, regardless of the fact that they are "artificial," as opposed to "natural," persons. 260 Further, these entities
have an existence separate and apart from that of their members, and
a distinct set of obligations, powers, and privileges. 26 1 From the paradigm of federal corporations, it is neither a particularly large nor daring step for Congress to vest environmental resources with the right to
sue, on their own behalf, for violations of environmental statutes.
3.

Proposal

Drawing from the paradigm of federal corporations, Congress
could empower groups of environmental resources to sue in federal
court "on their own behalf."2 62 Granting full corporate charters to

environmental resources, however, would be undesirable and unworkable; environmental resources obviously cannot engage in any sort of
management activities, and the broad implied powers of normal cor257 Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 n.19 (1982) (citing Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)). Rights adhering in a corporation may be constitutional, as in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936); statutory, as in
Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 378-79; or contractual, as in Railway Co. v. McCarthy,
96 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1878). The preceding cases involve corporations created under
state law. However, both state and federal corporations are legal entities apart from
their members. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823
(1824) (acknowledging the ability of the Bank of the United States to make contracts
and sue on its own behalf).
258 Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 379 n.19 (1982) (emphasis added).
259 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
260 See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 189 (1990) ("[T]he rule regarding
the treatment of corporations as 'citizens' has become firmly established ... .
261 Cedric Kushner Promotions,533 U.S. at 163.
262 Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 379 n.19 (1982).
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porations could raise myriad problems. 263 Therefore, Congress
should not endow environmental resources with the separate legal
existence of a corporation, but grant them only one power: the power
to bring citizen suits under environmental statutes.
To solve the disconnect between the injury-in-fact required to
convey constitutional standing and congressional intent in environmental statutes, 264 Congress should create groups of environmental
resources, and endow these groups with the power to sue in federal
court. This could be done in a fairly simple manner. First, Congress
should amend the definition of "persons," found in the citizen suit
provisions of environmental statutes, to include "any group designated as such by the Secretary of the Interior under

__

U.S.C.

__."

This would constitute the requisite statutory grant of standing, and
answer the judicial call for Congress to specifically state and give envi26 5
ronmental resources the power to sue.

Congress should then expand Title 16266 of the U.S. Code and
create a scheme by which to grant "citizen-suit charters" to groups of
environmental resources. A "citizen-suit charter" would grant a separate legal identity to an environmental resource, and empower that
resource to bring citizen suits under environmental statutes. The precise text could be as follows:
(a) The Secretary of the Interior shall grant a "citizen-suit charter"
to environmental resources, upon petition by any party. A "citizensuit charter" shall be granted upon a finding that an environmental
resource is, or is reasonably anticipated to be at some future time,
harmed by the violation of an environmental statute enumerated in
this section. "Citizen-suit charters" shall be granted, at a minimum,
to those species or sub-species designated as "endangered" or
"threatened" under the Endangered Species Act.
The Secretary of the Interior is the logical choice for granting
"citizen-suit charters" because of his role in the ESA. Under the ESA,
the Secretary of the Interior accepts petitions for an animal to be
263 Courts generally construe corporate powers broadly. See ROBERT H. HAMILTON
& JONATHON R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 227-28 (10th ed.
2007) (describing the decline of the ultra vires doctrine and movement toward broad
construction of corporate powers).
264 See supra Part II.C.
265 See Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Absent a
clear direction from Congress.. . we hold that animals do not have standing ....
").
266 I suggest adding the section to Title 16 in order to make a clear distinction
between these groups and "Tide 36" charters, which are granted to nonprofit organizations. See MOE, supra note 251, at 1.
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listed as endangered. 267 Once petitions are received, the Secretary
goes through a consultation process and eventually determines
whether the species should be listed. 268 Presumably, through this process, the Secretary garners some knowledge in environmental
resources, as well as expertise in the petitioning process itself. The
power to grant "citizen-suit charters" could conceivably be vested in
the EPA. However, given the fact that the EPA is empowered to
undertake enforcement actions pursuant to most environmental statutes, it makes sense to vest the power to grant "citizen-suit charters,"
which are designed to be another, more broad power of enforcement,
in a separate agency.
The statutory criteria are needed to establish an "intelligible principle" on which to base granting a "citizen-suit charter," thus avoiding
a non-delegation challenge. 269 The proposed criteria are purposefully
expansive, such that the Secretary could conceivably grant a charter to
nearly all environmental resources. This would be appropriate, as currently, citizen suits may be initiated to protect any and all environmental resources which suffer harm from violations of environmental laws.
The scope of protected resources under the amended section should
not be significantly restricted.
(b) The sole purpose of granting a "citizen-suit" charter is to
empower environmental resources to bring suit on their own behalf
under the "citizen suit" provisions enumerated in this section.
Accordingly, the sole power granted to a group holding a "citizensuit" charter is to bring suit under the Clean Water Act, the Clean
Air Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act, to enforce the protections afforded by those statutes.
Groups holding a "citizen-suit charter" shall not be empowered to
bring suit under any other statute or bring any common law causes
of action. The groups holding a "citizen-suit charter" exist as an
entity separate and apart from the United States government and
any resources making up the group. No claims, including counterclaims, may be brought against the group holding a "citizen-suit
charter," except that claims may be brought against an attorney representing such group under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
267 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2006) (providing for determination and listing of endangered species); RUHL ET AL., supranote 228, at 37-38 (describing application of these
provisions).
268 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a).
269 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001)
(requiring that an agency be given an " ' intelligible principle'" on which to exercise

legislative or quasi-legislative power (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928))).
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This section makes it clear that these groups are not intended to
be "normal" corporations, but rather a specialized group designed
specifically to promote effective enforcement of existing statutes via
citizen suit. Limiting the grant of standing to these particular statutes
would placate fears that environmental resources would become entitled to common law rights and remedies. Permitting Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11 claims to be brought against the attorney would
provide a disincentive to bringing abusive suits.
(c) The group holding the "citizen-suit charter" shall recover reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in a successful action, out of any
fine money awarded to the United States Government as a result of
a successful suit. The remainder of the fine money shall be paid to
the Government as if the action had been won by the United States
in an enforcement action brought under that same statute.
Section (c) would probably be the most controversial. Attorneys'
fees would be a valuable incentive to initiate citizen suits; however, it
could also be seen as an incentive for filing frivolous claims, or as creating a profitable market for nonexecutive enforcement of the law.
Permitting sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 would
put a damper on frivolous claims, but this provision could admittedly
encourage abusive litigation.
Section (c) would also solve the problem exhibited in the Laidlaw
case, where several Justices casted doubt on the proposition that a private party in a citizen suit could seek punitive fines to be paid to the
government. 270 Under this arrangement, a private party would have a
personal stake in the fine being awarded. Additionally, this would
echo qui tam actions of the past, making the whole concept perhaps
more palatable to the historically minded. 27 1
(d) Any attorney meeting the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)
factors shall be empowered to represent the chartered group in federal or state court.
This section probably poses the most practical problems. Once
the groups are created and given a citizen-suit charter, the obvious
question remains: who will bring the suit on behalf of the group, and
represent their interests in court? Incorporating the Rule 17(c) procedures provides a relatively well established test to determine who is

270 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 204
(2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
271 See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 174-77, for a discussion of qui tam actions and
possible implications for Article III standing.
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best suited to represent an incapacitated entity. 272 However, permitting only one lead representative for the group in each citizen suit
27 3
would lead to fierce competition between environmental groups.
Additionally, litigation of standing issues would simply be replaced by
Rule 1 7 (c) litigation; parties which meet the Rule 17(c) factors would
likely satisfy the traditional standing requirements. However, Rule
17(c) litigation would be centered around a different issue: who was
entitled to represent the environment, rather than who is entitled to
represent their own interests. The Rule 17(c) factors would ensure
that the groups will be represented by attorneys who are in the best
position to do so. Thus, a desirable function of the doctrine of standing will be retained, 2 74 while permitting litigants to couch their claims
in terms of the harm to the environment, thus removing the harmful
2 75
effects of the current situation.
(e) Groups holding a "citizen-suit charter" shall not have any of the
powers adhering to charters granted in any other section of the
United States Code, and Chartered Groups exist only for the purposes of bringing citizen-suit actions under the statutes enumerated
in part (a) of this section.
This section would prevent courts from confusing "citizen-suit
charters" with other charters, thus keeping the powers of the groups
in this section from being overly broad.
4.

Alternatives

The proposed text is just one of several approaches Congress
could take. Below, I discuss two alternatives that would meet different
concerns.
Section (d) of the proposal could permit the Secretary of the
Interior to appoint attorneys or groups of attorneys to represent each
chartered group. This, however, would add a political bent to the
enforcement of citizen suits, and perhaps lead to appointment of
attorneys based upon factors other than who would best represent the
interests of the group. Because citizen-suit provisions are designed to
272 For a discussion of the Rule 17(c) factors, and their applicability for citizen
suits under the ESA, see Burke, supra note 9, at 652-55.
273 See RUHL, supra note 228, at 896 (noting that there are sometimes "turf wars"
when multiple NGOs are involved in a single citizen suit).
274 See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE LJ. 221, 222 (1988)
(noting that standing "ensur[es] that the people most directly concerned are able to
litigate the questions at issue").
275 See supra Part II.C for a discussion of the harmful effects of the current
situation.
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spread the enforcement power around the population, as opposed to
keeping it concentrated in the political branches, 2 76 permitting any
party who satisfies the Rule 17(c) factors to represent the group seems
to be more in line with congressional intent.
Congress could also determine whether or not to make this the
sole means through which citizen suits may be brought. Although this
option would eliminate the disconnect highlighted in this Note, it
would restrict the amount of potential "private attorneys general"
available to enforce the statute. Thus, I would encourage Congress to
permit plaintiffs to invoke the citizen-suit provision on behalf of themselves, as is currently done, until the effectiveness of the chartering
program is ascertained. If the program is successful, then perhaps
eventually it could become the sole means through which citizen suits
could be initiated.
5.

Objections

Some would likely object to the proposed amendments on the
grounds that granting standing to environmental resources would
entail "[r]adical changes in our legal institutions" that would have
"serious, detrimental impacts on human rights and freedoms." 277
These objections, however, seem misplaced. After all, Congress has
already passed significant statutes designed to protect the air, water,
and endangered species. 278 At issue is the effective enforcement of
those statutes, not the substance of their provisions. Objections
revolving around whether environmental resources should be protected, at the expense of persons' rights, are entirely separate from
objections to Congress' protection of those resources in a manner
which tailors the harm prevented by the statute with the injury-in-fact
sufficient to convey standing.
276 See Cross, supra note 3, at 55.
277 David R. Schmahmann & Lori J. Polacheck, The Case Against Rights for Animals,
22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 747, 748-49 (1995). Notably, these objections are aimed
at those seeking to extend legal rights to animals, generally. Id. at 749. It is likely,
however, that granting animals the ability (or "right") to sue would evoke these same
objections. Although Schmahmann and Polacheck mention the ESA, they contend
that the Act does not convey rights to animals, but rather "seek[s] to conserve
nature's diversity with an eye towards man's long-term interests." Id. at 768. This may
be true, but the fact remains that the ESA protects animals, not persons. In noting that
"courts have focused on the impacts on the human environment and have refused to
let the well-being of animals outweigh those impacts," id. at 771, Schmahmann and
Polacheck are correct; however, the reason courts do so is because standingrequires
harm to persons, not because the statute itself protects persons.
278 See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (2006); Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1294-1297 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2006).
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Notably, these types of objections do not invoke the concerns
expressed by courts when denying standing in citizen suits. The
requirements of standing are voiced in terms of injury to the plaintiff,
without regards to the identity of the plaintiff.279 The concerns

underlying standing decisions deal with separation of powers, and
courts' proper role in constitutional governance. 2 0 In fact, many
plaintiffs in environmental suits are corporations or other associations, as opposed to "real" human persons. 28 ' For purposes of standing, one of the association's members must be injured (thus the focus
on whether a human has been injured),282 but the association itself
has the right to sue.
These amendments would arguably introduce political factors
into the enforcement process. One could imagine powerful interests
lobbying the Secretary of the Interior to deny charters to certain
resources, or the Secretary simply being unwilling to grant them in
the first place. However, Congress could minimize this concern by
mandating the grant of citizen suit charters upon a finding of statutory factors. Political pressure would be more of a concern if the Secretary were empowered to appoint attorneys to represent the
chartered groups; the Secretary could simply appoint attorneys who
were hesitant to bring suit, or who were not best suited to represent
the groups' interests. This could be mitigated by empowering any
attorney who meets the "best friend" factors to represent a chartered
group in court. Although this would not completely mitigate the
political pressures, it would certainly lessen them.
Additionally, opponents might argue that these provisions would
simply shift litigation from the standing requirements to the Rule
17(c) factors. This is true; and, any attorneys who meet the 17(c) factors would likely be those who could satisfy the standing requirements,
anyway. However, litigation surrounding the 17(c) factors has different focus: who can best represent the environmental interests, not to
279 See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text. Of course, part of the reason
why no such objections have been raised is because standing to environmental
resources has not been statutorily granted. However, it remains true that the concerns of the Court in applying the doctrine of standing do not relate to the identity of
the parties, but rather to separation of powers.
280 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 209-10 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (lamenting the deprivation of executive
discretion by overly lenient standing rules); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 559-60 (1992) (discussing the separation of powers justification for the doctrine
of standing).
281 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 729-30
(1972).
282 Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004).
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whom the cognizable injury is done. Thus, the purpose of the statutes
is preserved, while still ensuring that those who can best represent the
interests of the environmental resources are those bringing suit.
Certainly, this proposal does not do away with courts' standing
inquiry. Plaintiffs will still have to prove injury-in-fact, causation, and
redressability, and overcome any prudential barriers raised by the
courts. However, the terms of the standing inquiry will be transformed: the injury-in-fact conveying standing will be injury to the environment, which is the harm Congress sought to prevent in passing the
statute. Thus, the disconnect between injury-in-fact and congressional
purpose will be solved. Environmental plaintiffs will be able to harness the full rhetorical value of couching their claims in terms of harm
to the environment, thus transforming an attempt to remedy Thomas
Rider's inability to watch elephants in the circus show into a campaign
against the abuse of elephants.

283

Perhaps most importantly, this

transformation would occur without requiring Article III courts to
reconsider their asserted role in our system of government.
CONCLUSION

From the purposes and structure of environmental statutes, it is
clear that Congress sought to protect the environment from manmade threats. 28 4 To enforce these protections Congress empowered
individuals to bring suit in Article III courts, thus bypassing the
problems inherent in agency enforcement. 285 Article III standing
requirements interfere with these goals, barring plaintiffs who are
unable to assert a cognizable injury to their own interests.2 8 6 Even
when plaintiffs do assert a cognizable injury-in-fact, they are forced to
posture their citizen suits in terms of personal interest, seriously
287
undermining the rhetorical power and effectiveness of their claims.

Phrased differently: in environmental statutes, Congress attempted to
protect trees in the forest, but courts only permit enforcement when
someone is around to hear the trees fall.
The tension between the doctrine of standing and congressional
intent in environmental statutes stems from the judiciary's understanding of its role in our constitutional system of governance. 288
Courts generally serve as adjudicators of "private rights" disputes,
283
284
285
286
zable
287
288

See notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
See sources cited supra note 131.
See supra Part II.B.2 for examples of plaintiffs who were unable to assert cogniinjuries-in-fact.
See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
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while leaving the vindication of public rights to the political
branches. 28 9 Citizen suits do not fit the classical paradigm of private
rights disputes; indeed, they were created as an alternative to enforcement actions-a role traditionally played by the executive branch.
Additionally, Congress sought to prevent harm to the environment,
yet only persons or groups of persons are empowered to enforce statutory protections in court. Taking this into account, the tension
between congressional intent and the doctrine of standing is
understandable.
Although most critics urge the courts to reformulate the doctrine
of standing, 290 this Note urges Congress to take it upon themselves to
heal the divergence. Congress could do so in two manners: providing
a "public rights" forum, in the form of an Article I tribunal, or granting environmental resources the right to bring citizen suits. An Article I tribunal would probably be constitutional; however, there would
be serious concerns about the political independence of such a tribunal. Notably, these concerns are substantially similar to those which
drove Congress to create citizen suits in the first place. Therefore,
creating an Article I tribunal would be an unsatisfactory solution to
resolving the disconnect highlighted in this Note. 29 1
Congress could, and should, remedy this disconnect by granting
environmental resources the limited right to bring citizen suits under
environmental statutes. The paradigm of federal corporations reveals
a long and well-established history of creating legal entities to achieve
specific policy ends.2 92 Drawing on this paradigm, Congress should
empower the Secretary of the Interior to grant "citizen-suit charters"
to environmental resources, thus giving them the ability to bring citizen suits under environmental statutes. 293 This would ensure that violations of environmental statutes conveyed standing regardless of the
existence of an incidental injury to third parties. Further, citizen-suit
charters would preserve enforcement power outside of the political
branches, foster participation in environmental law, and permit issues
to be litigated in the name of resources themselves, thus furthering
the original goals of citizen suits. Perhaps most importantly, this
would all be accomplished without requiring the Article III courts to
reconsider the nature of their role within the American tripartite system of governance.
289 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
290 See sources cited supra note 19.
291 See supra Part III.A.3.
292 See supra Part III.B.2.
293 See supra Part III.B.3 for the specific proposal.
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